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There are many reasons why a country may wish to protect an
industry from foreign competition. The arguments that have been
put forward in favor of erecting a protectionist barrier (such as tariﬀ
or quota) include, among others, the infant-industry argument1,t h e
national defense argument, and the cultural identity argument.
Concerns have been expressed in many circles on possible detri-
mental eﬀects of globalization on cultural diversity. In some countries,
policy makers have taken these concerns very seriously. Canada and
France are two G7 countries that have in place policies to prevent
the possible loss of cultural identity that might result from free trade.
France has restrictions on foreign ﬁlms and television programs from
English-speaking countries, while Canada requires minimum level of
Canadian content in radio and television broadcast. Canadian maga-
zines are protected by government tax laws that disciminate against
Canadian companies that place their advertisements in foreign maga-
zines imported into Canada (in particular, US-based magazines such
as Sports Illustrated, Time, etc.). Similarly, South Korea has restric-
tions on music CD’s imported from Japan.
There are, however, very few formal models of eﬀects of trade on
culture, or on welfare which includes cultural identity as an argument.
Three recent papers stand out. Janeba (2004) formalizes the notion of
cultural identity and incorporates it in a Ricardian model of trade. He
adopts the “indentity function” formulation of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000), whereby (i) a person suﬀers a utility loss if some individuals
in his country deviates from the social norms, and (ii) an individual
who deviates from social norms incurs a direct utility loss for the self-
inﬂicted loss of identity (but he may still achieve a net gain in doing so,
when the foreign good becomes suﬃciently cheap). One of Janeba’s
results is that trade is not always Pereto superior to autarky. This
is because of the public good aspect implied by (i) above. Suranovic
1See Kemp, 1960, and Clemhout and Wan, 1970, on infant-industry and
learning-by-doing.2
and Winthorp (2003) present two models of trade when consumers or
workers care about culture. In their ﬁrst model, called the “cultural
aﬃnity from work” model, workers in a particular industry receive
non-pecuniary cultural beneﬁts (NPCB) from work. If trade liberal-
ization causes this industry to decline, the gains from trade in the
case where NPCB exist are smaller than under the standard textbook
case. In their second model, called the “cultural externality model,”
consumption of the home-produced culture good by each person in
the home country has a positive external eﬀect on all his compatriots.
As a result, the optimal tariﬀ is positive even if the country is a small
open economy (even though the tariﬀ is inferior to a consumption
subsidy). Francois and Ypersele (2002) consider the protection of a
cultural good the production of which involves a ﬁxed cost. A tariﬀ
on Hollywood movies can be Pareto superior to free trade if it makes
local movies viable.
While arguments for protection must clearly be based on the public
goods or externalities associated with the production and/or consump-
tion of cultural goods, in this paper we propose to focus on a diﬀerent
aspect of the problem of trade and culture: the eﬀects of trade on the
evolution of preferences.We provide a dynamic model which shows
that, in the long run, free trade may result in the demise of cultural
diversity: a relatively small country may gradually lose its cultural
identity when it engages in free trade with a larger country that has
ad i ﬀe r e n tp r e f e r e n c ep a t t e r n . R e l a t i v ew o r l dp r i c ei se n d o g e n o u si n
this model, and changes over time as the distribution of preferences
evolves in each economy.
Our approach is essentially based on the biological evolutionary
theory, but the model must be interpreted in a broader sense, as it will
become clear in what follows. The argument that preferences evolve
is basically drawn from the Darwinian theory of evolution2,a n dc a n
readily be seen in the context of animal populations. Suppose that
2Evolution-based explanation of of the prevalence of certain preference traits
in human societies has been provided by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973),
Hirschleifer (1977,1978), Bergstrom (1995), Robson (1996), and others.3
there are two species of bears in an island, with one species being
essentially ﬁsh-eaters, and the other being largely herbivorous. If ﬁsh
is readily available in the island, then natural selection will favor the
former species, while if plant foods are more abundant, the latter
species will be selected by evolution. In the long run, the distribution
of preferences will reﬂect relative availability of the diﬀerent types of
food3.
While preference selection in the biological sense described in the
above paragraph may have been relevant for human populations in
the past (and perhaps it may even be applicable to some developing
c o u n t r i e st o d a y )i ti sb yn om e a n st h eo n l yw a yi nw h i c hn a t u r a l
selection of preferences due to scarcity or abundance arises. Another
important cause for preference changes is imitation,w h i c hc a nh a p p e n
if, for instance, people have preferences for conformity (such as keeping
up with the Joneses, etc., see Stephen R. Jones, 1984), or if there are
network externalities of the social or informational type (see, e.g.,
Schelling, 1978, Rogers, 1983, Katz and Shapiro, 1986, Arthur, 1989,
Karni and Schmeidler, 1990, Bhikchandani, Hirschleifer, and Welch,
1992). Imitation may be favored by many factors, such as conformity
pressure, or relative cheapness. We focus on the latter. If a good is
abundant, its price is likely to be low, and the number of users of the
good will be high. This in turn increases the possibility of imitation
and thereby raises the representation of preferences favoring this good
in the population.4
Another possibility for natural selection is due to learning-by-doing.
3The diet of the giant panda is a good example of how selective pressures of
this kind operate. See Gould (1987).
4Conformity or herd behavior may in some cases be a more important factor. A
preference shock in favor of a commodity raises the demand for it, and also raises
its price. The former eﬀect may cause a second round of increased demand: more
people will consume the good due to conformity pressure. The price rise may be
able to provide a powerful countervailing force. We are indebted to a referee for
pointing this out. We have decided to focus on the price eﬀect, because it would
be unwieldy to develop a model that takes too many factors into account. For a
model of trade and culture that emphasizes conformity, see Janeba (2004).4
If a good is widely available, it is possible to experiment with it cheaply
and thereby ﬁnd many uses for it. Over time the preferences in the
society will move in favor of such a good. A good example is the
coconut tree, which is abundant in coastal areas of tropical regions.
Nearly every part of the tree has found uses (for lighting, food, drink,
clothing and even canoe-making). By contrast, societies which are far
away from the seas or located in colder regions of the world will not
have well-developed preferences for coconuts or coconut trees.
Finally, habit formation may also induce preference selection. Chil-
dren growing up in environments where certain habits (such as music
appreciation or taste for spicy foods) are prevalent among adults are
likely to acquire them as well. Thus these preferences are transmitted
across generations (Becker, 1993). The more easily available is the
good, the greater the capacity for it to become part of a habit, and
the higher is the possibility that such preferences will be selected over
time.
Our model is formulated in discrete time. In each period, adults
make their consumption decisions, and leave no bequests. This pe-
riod’s chidren are next period’s adults. The ﬁtter adults have rel-
atively more “children”. “Children” inherit the preference traits of
their “parents”. Here the words “children” and “parents” must be
interpreted in the “cultural sense” rather than the biological sense.
Biologically sterile individuals can have “children” in the sense that
they can have cultural inﬂuence on members of the next generation.
Thus, a “gene” may be interpreted in the sense of a cultural gene, that
is, a “meme” (a word coined Dawkins, 1986, to mimic the biological
concept of gene.) We do not however model the conscious decision
of adults to spend resources to spread their “memes”. For models
along these lines, see Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) in which “pref-
erences of children are acquired through an adaptation and imitation
process which depends on their parents’ socialization actions, and on
the cultural and social environment in which children live.”(Bisin and
Verdier, 2001, p.299.)
We begin our analysis by modelling the evolution of preferences5
in an autarkic economy, in which there are two preference types. All
individuals have the same endowment bundle consisting of two goods.
We show that if the relative supply of the two goods is not too ex-
treme, then there exists a heterogenous distribution5 of preferences
in the population, which is globally stable. The stability is ensured
by the price mechanism interacting with the dynamics of changes in
the preference distribution. On the other hand, if the bundle is at one
e x t r e m e ,t h e no n et y p eo fp r e f e r e n c ew i l lb ew i p e do u ti nt h el o n g - r u n .
After characterizing autarkic equilibrium, we turn to an analysis
of trade between two economies with diﬀerent preference patterns at
the time trade opens, and the resulting changes in preferences within
each economy. We show that if one economy is much larger than the
other, then in the long run the distribution of preferences in the small
economy under free trade will be identical to the autarkic long-run
pattern of preferences of the large economy, in other words, the small
economy will lose its cultural identity. In particular, it is possible that
under autarky the small economy has a stable heterogenous distribu-
tion of preferences, and under free trade, both countries end up with
only one (and the same) preference type.
Before proceeding to the main model, we should pause to comment
on related literature on preference changes.
The idea of natural selection of preferences is not new. Becker
(1976) discusses the evolution of altruism using the concept of genetic
ﬁtness; Hansson and Stewart (1990) mention intergenerational sav-
ings in the context of preference selection; Rogers (1994) models the
evolution of the rate of time preference by natural selection. Bisin
and Verdier (2000,2001) focus on parents’ time-allocation decision to
socialize their children. In contrast to these papers, our model study
the link between relative scarcity of diﬀerent goods and preference
evolution.
5Bisin and Verdier (2001, p.300) also obtained a stable long-run heterogenous
distribution, but they relied on the assumption of substitutability between (a)
parents’ eﬀorts of socializing their children, and (b) children’s cultural adaptation
and imitation from society at large.6
More generally, our work is related to the literature dealing with
the alteration of tastes over time due to social inﬂuences or habit for-
mation (see, e.g., Leibenstein, 1950, von Weizsacker, 1971, Pollack,
1976, Becker and Murphy, 1989, Leonard, 1989, Karni and Schmei-
dler, 1990, and Pesendorfer, 1995). While these papers deal with the
evolution of tastes by individuals in partial equilibrium, or in a strate-
gic setting, our paper provides a general equilibrium formulation, with
relative price in competitive equilibrium being allowed to inﬂuence the
future distribution of tastes in the society as a whole. Bell (1994) de-
velops a model of preference evolution in a spatial economy: agents are
located on a lattice and modify the parameters of their Cobb-Douglas
preferences based upon the consumption pattern in their immediate
neighborhood. Bell’s paper primarily discusses simulation results6,i n
contrast to our analytical approach.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the cultural dimension
which is investigated in this paper is purely private, in that we have
chosen not to incorporate the public good component, as this as-




Let us begin by considering a closed economy. There are two goods
(apples and bananas), two types of individuals (apple lovers and ba-
nana lovers). The utility function of the representative apple lover is
denoted by UA(a,b) where a and b are the quantities of apples and
bananas he consumes. Similarly, the utility function of the represen-
tative banana lover is denoted by UB(a,b) .
Assumption A1:A ta n yc o m m o np o i n t( a,b), an apple lover’s
marginal rate of substitution of bananas for apples is greater than that
6Our proposition that greater abundance of the endowment of a good leads to
its higher representation in the steady state is conﬁrmed by her simulations.7










For example, starting from a given bundle (a,b), if the left-hand
side of inequality (1) is 2 and the right-hand side is 1/2, this signiﬁes
that to persuade an apple lover to give up an apple, you must give him
two bananas, while to persuade a banana lover to give up an apple,
you need to bribe him only half a banana).
Assumption A2: Utility functions are homothetic, strictly quasi-













Remark 1: The Cobb-Douglas utility function and the CES util-
ity function satisﬁes A2.
Assumption A3: Each individual has an endowment vector con-
sisting of 1 apple and k bananas. (Here k is a strictly positive real
number.)
Assumption A4: The preferences of the two type of consumers
are diametrically opposed, in the sense that, for all pairs of positive
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If we draw indiﬀerence curves for the two types, they will cross
each other on the 45 degree line, which serves as a “mirror.” It follows8
that if the relative price is unity, then both representative individuals
will have the same level of utility. (Recall that all individuals have the
same endowment vector, and hence the same income.)
Each individual lives for one period. There is a market in each pe-
riod, where individuals trade, with the objective of maximizing their
life-time (i.e. one-period) utility. Individuals take the market rela-
tive price as given. After trade, they consume, and they reproduce.
Individuals do not bequeath to their oﬀsprings.
T h ep o p u l a t i o ni sd e n o t e db yNt, which we assume to be constant
Nt = Nt+1 = N.L e t rt denote the proportion of apple lovers in the
population at time t,a n d1−rt t h ep r o p o r t i o no fb a n a n al o v e r si nt h e
population at time t.
The equilibrium market price of apple (in terms of bananas) in
period t is a function of (i) the proportion of apple lovers rt and (ii)
the relative supply of bananas, k.W ew r i t e
pt = p(rt,k)
N o ww em u s tm a k ea na s s u m p t i o na b o u tt h el a wo fm o t i o no f
rt. Here we are assuming replicator dynamics, which has been suc-
cessfully employed in biology (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988) and in
evolutionary game theory (see Maitlath, 1992, and references cited
therein).
Assumption A5: The law of motion of the proportion of apple
lovers in the population is given by
rt+1 = f(rt)=
rt
rt +( 1− rt)pt
(2)
Remark 2: The replicator dynamics described by (2) has an intu-
itively plausible interpretation. There will be no change in the propor-
tion of apple lovers (i.e., rt+1 = rt)i fa n do n l yi frt+(1−rt)pt =1 ,i . e . ,
if and only if the relative price of apple is unity. If for some reason the
r e l a t i v ep r i c eo fa p p l ei sg r e a t e rt h a nu n i t y ,a p p l el o v e r sw i l lb ea ta
disadvantage relative to banana lovers. This will reduce their ﬁtness,
and consequently, their reproduction rate will be lower relative to that9
of banana lovers. The rule (2) means that the future share of apple
lovers in the population depends positively on the current share (for
given pt) and negatively on the current price of apple, pt. However,
we should note that the current p depends on the current r,t h r o u g h
demand and supply interaction.
As we have discussed in the introduction, the word “oﬀsprings”
should not be interpreted as biological children. Here we are talking
about cultural inﬂuences. People who are “less ﬁt” will have less
inﬂuence on the younger people they come into contact with. Take
the example of Quebec, where both French and English newspapers,
magazines, and books are read. If French-language books become
relatively more expensive than English-language books, the proportion
of people whose preferences are biased toward French-language books
will tend to fall, even though the biological reproduction rates are
roughly the same for all groups. Of course our model is very simple
and cannot capture all the real world features. In particular, we do not
model parents’ resource allocation decisions7 s u c ha st h et i m es p e n t
with the child, the school to which the child is sent, etc.




st +( 1− st)qt
It follows that Assumption 5 is not biased in favor of any good, or any
preference type, and that the choiceo ft h en u m e r a i r eh a sn ob e a r i n g
on the results.
2.2. Market clearing price in a closed economy
In any period t,g i v e nrt and k,w ec a nd e ﬁne a relative price pA(k)
(of apple in terms of bananas) at which apple lovers’ net demand for
7These factors are discussed in Bisin and Verdier (2001, pp 306-307), but only
a reduced form model is used.10





At any relative price p>p A(k), apple lovers will be net sellers of
apples, and at any price p<p A(k), they will be net buyers of apples.
We call pA(k) the self-suﬃciency price of apple lovers.
Similarly, we deﬁne a relative price pB(k) (of apple in terms of





At any relative price p>p B(k), banana lovers will be net sellers of
apples, and at any price p<p B(k), they will be net buyers of apples.
We call pB(k) the self-suﬃciency price of banana lovers.




The following result can be proved:
Lemma 1: Under Assumptions A1 to A3, for each rt ∈ [0,1],a n d
each k>0, there exists a unique market clearing price pt = p(rt,k).
This price has the following properties. First, it lies between the two
self-suﬃciency prices:
p
A(k) ≥ p(rt,k) ≥ p
B(k) > 0
Second, the greater is the proportion of apple lovers, the higher is the




Third, the greater the endowment of bananas per person, the higher




Proof: see the Appendix.
Remark 4: The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. An
increase in rt will increase the aggregate relative demand for apples,
and thus the relative price of apple will rise. An increase in k will
reduce the aggregate relative supply for apples, and thus the relative
price of apple will rise.
N e x t ,w en o t et h a tt h es e l f - s u ﬃcient prices pA(k) and pB(k) are
increasing functions of the relative abundance of bananas, as measured
by k. I tf o l l o w sf r o mA s s u m p t i o n sA 1t oA 3t h a tt h e r ee x i s tt w o






where kB > 1 >k A.
The following lemma can be proved:
Lemma 2: (i) if the endowment of bananas per person is smaller
than kA, then the market clearing price of apple (in terms of bananas)
is less than unity, regardless of the actual value rt ∈ [0,1] :
p(r,k) < 1 for all k<k
A
(ii) if the endowment of bananas per person exceeds kB, then the
market clearing price of apple (in terms of bananas) is greater than
unity, regardless of the actual value rt ∈ [0,1] :
p(r,k) > 1 for all k>k
B
(iii) if the endowment of bananas per person is in the open interval
(kA,k B), then there exists a unique value r∗(k) ∈ (0,1) such that
p(r
∗(k),k)=1
and p(r,k) > 1 for r>r ∗(k) while p(r,k) < 1 for r<r ∗(k).
Proof: One can construct a simple diagram where relative con-
sumption is measured along the horizontal axis and relative price, p,i s12
measured along the vertical axis. The relative demand curve RA(p) (of
apples to bananas) of the representative apple lover is downward slop-
i n g ,a n dl i e se v e r y w h e r ea b o v et h er e l a t i v ed e m a n dc u r v eRB(p) of the
representative banana lover. The intersection between the horizontal
line p =1and the curve RA(p) (respectively, RB(p)) yields the value
1/kA (respectively 1/kB) on the horizontal axis. Thus 1/kA > 1/kB.
The market clearing price is where the relative supply curve inter-
sects the aggregate relative demand curve (which lies between the two
curves RA(p) and RB(p)). Thus if k>k A, the relative supply curve
(of apples to bananas) must intersect the aggregate relative demand
curve at some p<1. Similarly, if k<k B, the relative supply curve
(of apples to bananas) must intersect the aggregate relative demand
curve at some p>1. This proves (i) and (ii). Part (iii) follows.
Remark 5: It can be shown that r∗(k) is decreasing in k.
2.3. Evolution of preference distribution in a closed economy
We want to determine the evolution of the proportion of apple
lovers over time. From the postulated replicator law (2), if rt =0 ,
then rt+τ =0for all positive integer τ. Similarly, if rt =1then
rt+τ =1for all positive integer τ.T h u sr =0and r =1are two ﬁxed
points of the mapping f(.). Are there any other ﬁxed points? The
answer is given in Proposition 1:
Proposition 1:(multiplicity of ﬁxed points)
(i) if k ≤ kA then there are only two ﬁxed points, r =0and r =1
(ii) if k ≥ kB, then there are only two ﬁxed points, r =0and r =1
(iii) if k ∈ (kA,k B) then there are only three ﬁxed points: r =0,
r =1and r = r∗(k) where r∗(k) satisﬁes p(r∗(k),k)=1 .
Proof: A ﬁxed point is a value b r such that
b r =
b r
b r +( 1− b r)p(b r,k)
(3)
Clearly, b r =1and b r =0both satisfy equation (3). Any other ﬁxed
point b r in (0,1) must satisfy
b r +( 1− b r)p(b r,k)=1 (4)13
The left-hand side of (4) is a weighted average of 1 and p(b r,k).T h u s
for the left-hand side to equal the right-hand side, it must be the
case that p(b r,k)=1 .I f k<k A,then p(r,k) > 1,t h u sv i o l a t i n g
(4). If k>k B,t h e np(r,k) < 1 thus violating (4). If k = kA,t h e n
p(b r,kA)=1only if b r =1 . k = kB,t h e np(b r,kB)=1only if b r =0 .
Finally, if k ∈ (kA,k B), p(b r,k)=1at a unique b r(k) by virtue of
Lemma 2.
Remark 6: Proposition 1 is about the existence of ﬁxed points.
To study the stability of ﬁxed points, we must make an additional
assumption.
From (2) we calculate
f
0(r)=
p(r,k) − r(1 − r)pr(r,k)
[r − p(r,k)(1 − r)]
2
Assumption A6: if the proportion of apple lovers rises by x per
cent, then the market clearing price of apple will rise by less than










Remark 7: The Cobb-Douglas utility functions satisfy Assump-
tion A6. This assumption ensures that f0(r) > 0.
Proposition 2:(possible heterogeneity of steady state pref-
erences)
Suppose r0 ∈ (0,1). Under Assumptions A1 to A6,
(i) if the banana endowment is small, such that k ≤ kA,then rt will
converge to unity, i.e., banana lovers will become extinct in the long
run.
(ii) if the banana endowment is large, such that k ≥ kB,then rt
will converge to zero, i.e., apple lovers will become extinct in the long
run.
(iii) if k ∈ (kA,kB), then the proportion of apple lovers will con-
verge to a ﬁnite number r∗(k) ∈ (0,1).14
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 8: Part (iii) of Proposition 2 implies that there exists
a stable steady state that exhibits heterogeneity of preferences if the
initial endowments of the two goods are relatively close to each other
(i.e., the ratio of bananas to apples in the endowment bundle is neither
very great, nor very small). The intuition underlying this result is as
follows: as the evolutionarily favored preference type increases its rep-
resentation in the population, this increase raises the demand for the
good which this preference type prefers, thereby raising its price and
causing the other preference type to gain an evolutionary advantage.
Provided the relative endowment of one good to the other is neither
too great, nor too small, this negative feedback eﬀect is suﬃciently
strong to ensure that neither type becomes extinct in the long run,
i.e., heterogeneity prevails8.
There is a direct relationship between the relative abundance of
bananas and the proportion of apple lovers in the steady state. When
bananas are very scarce (i.e., k ≤ kA) the relative price of apples is low,
so that apple lovers are evolutionary selected to the extent that banana
lovers become extinct. Thus, with k ≤ kA, the unique stable restpoint
is r =1 . When the endowment of bananas is in the intermediate
range (kA <k<k B), the price of apples rises suﬃciently when there
are a large number of apple lovers to ensure that neither preference
type can become extinct in the long run. Furthermore, the larger the
availability of bananas in the economy, the greater the representation
of banana lovers in the steady state. Finally, if the endowment of
bananas is very large (k ≥ kB), the relative price of apples is so high
that natural selection drives apple lovers to extinction.
Discussion: We have made use of the negative feedback that re-
sults from the price mechanism to establish a stable equilibrium with
heterogenous preferences. A similar negative feedback operates in the
model of Bisin and Verdier (2001, p. 303), but their negative feed-
8Preference cycles may exist if we modify Assumption A5 so that the denom-
inator of the dynamic rule (2) becomes non-linear in price. See Appendix II for
this generalization.15
back relies instead on the assumption that vertical cultural transmis-
sion and oblique cultural transmission are cultural substitutes.There
is no endogenous relative price of goods in their model. When vertical
cultural transmission and oblique cultural transmission are cultural
complements, their interior equilibrium is completely unstable (their
Figure 2). We could generate a completely unstable interior equilib-
rium in a modiﬁed version of our model by allowing for phenomena
such as conformism and herd behavior. However, this would detract
from our focus on standard relative supply and relative demand inter-
actions.
3. Trade between two economies
Consider two countries, say home (H)a n df o r e i g n( F). In each
country, there are apple lovers and banana lovers. The utility function
of each type of individual is the same regardless of the country they
live in. The home country is as described in the preceding section.
In H, each individual is born with an endowment vector (1,k) (one
apple, and k bananas). In the foreign country F, each individual is
born with an endowment vector (δ,1) (one banana and δ apples) where
δ>0.Ah i g hv a l u eo fδ indicates the relative abundance of apples in
this country. The population in H is Nt = N and the population in
F is Mt = M. The parameter m = M/N reﬂects the relative size of
country F.
Let ri
t denote the proportion of apple lovers in the population of
country i.( i = H,F) .T h ed y n a m i ce v o l u t i o nf o rt h eh o m ec o u n t r y











t ,k) is the home country market clearing price under au-
tarky. From Proposition 2, we know that if k ≥ kB,t h e ni nt h el o n g
run, under autarky, banana lovers will dominate (there will be no ap-
ple lovers left.) On the other hand, if k ∈ (kA,kB) then the home16
country will exhibit heterogeneous preferences in the long run. We
admit both cases.
We now turn to the foreign country. First, consider the foreign











t ,1/δ) is the foreign country market clearing price under
autarky. By a familiar argument, there exists two positive numbers
δ
A and δ








A > 1 >δ
B.( I nf a c t ,δ
A =1 /kA and δ
B =1 /kB). Clearly, if
δ ≥ δ
A then under autarky, in the long run the preferences of apple
lovers will dominate in country F.
We can now consider the eﬀect of trade on these two economies.
Suppose that k ≥ kB and δ ≥ δ
A and that the economies have been
autarkic until some large time T, after which they start to trade.
Under these circumstances, the proportion of banana lovers in the
home country will be close to unity, while the proportion of apple
lovers in the foreign country will be close to unity.
We can then show that if the foreign economy is suﬃciently large
relative to the home economy (a large m), then free trade between the
two countries will lead to the eventual extinction of banana lovers in
the home country.
Let pw(rH,r F,k,δ,m) denote the market clearing world price. To
ensure that this equilibrium is unique, we need the following assump-
tion:
Assumption A7: In each country i, the excess demand function
for apples is downward sloping at every p>0,a ta l lri ∈ [0,1].
Remark 9: Assumption A7 is satisﬁed if the utility functions are
Cobb-Douglas, or CES with elasticity of substitution greater than
unity.17























,f o rt ≥ T.
We can then prove the following proposition:
Proposition 3:(The demise of cultural diversity) Assume
δ ≥ δ
A . For any given initial vector (rH
T ,r F
T) that is strictly positive,
there exists an m∗ > 0 such that if m>m ∗,t h e ni nt h el o n gr u nt h e r e
will only be apple lovers in each country (i.e., the banana lovers will
vanish in the long run.)
Remark 10: An implication of Proposition 3 is that if the home
country starts at an autarkic long-run steady state with heterogenous
preferences and decides to open trade with the foreign country, then
eventually whole world will end up with only one preference type left:
that of the large country.9
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is as follows.It is assumed that
the foreign country has a large endowment of apples. Thus, if the
foreign country is much larger than the home country, the equilibrium
price of apple under free trade will be very low (i.e., bananas will be
very expensive) and consequently the banana lovers in both economies
will become extinct.
4. Conclusions
We have considered a simple model of preference evolution in a
society with two goods and two preference types. The distribution of
preferences changes in response to changes in the relative price. We
9As pointed out by a referee, an alternative reading of Proposition 3 is that
when two social classes are integrated, the rich class, if it is rich enough, will end
up by culturally dominating the poor class.18
s h o wt h a tw h e nt h ee n d o w m e n to fo n eo ft h eg o o d si nt h es o c i e t y
is small, the unique stable steady state involves the extinction of of
the preference type which exhibits a relative liking for the good in
limited supply. When the endowments of the two goods are closed
to each other, both preference types are represented in the long-run
equilibrium.
Within this framework, we consider the impact of trade upon two
societies which have previously evolved in isolation and consequently
have very diﬀe r e n tp r e f e r e n c e s . W es h o wt h a ti fo n eo ft h ec o u n t r y
is large, its preferences will eventually drive the other’s preferences to
extinction.
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APPENDIX I
A.PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We show the existence and uniqueness of the market clearing price
p(r,k), a n dt h e no b t a i ni t sc o m p a r a t i v es t a t i cp r o p e r t i e s .F i xk>0.
Recall that the self-suﬃciency price ratios satisfy pA(k) >p B(k).F o r
any price p>p A(k), the apple lovers will be net sellers of apples, and
so will be banana lovers. So the equilibrium price cannot be above
pA(k). A similar argument show that the equilibrium price cannot be
below pB(k). Clearly, if r =1or r =0 , then the unique competitive
price is pA(k) or pB(k) respectively. In what follows, we consider
r ∈ (0,1).
It will be convenient to use a slightly more general notation, where
each individual in this economy has an endowment bundle (g,k) which
consists of g apples and k bananas. (Later, we set g =1 ).
Each agent’s income in terms of bananas is I(p,g,k)=pg + k.
(Here, g means g apples, and k means k bananas). Let xA(p,I(p,g,k))
denote the Marshallian demand function for apples by a representative
apple lover, and xB(p,I(p,g,k))the Marshallian demand function for
apples by a representative banana lover. The economy-wide per capita












This function is continuous. Now set g =1 . Recall z(p;r,1,k) is
negative at pA(k) and positive at pB(k). Thus, by the mean value
theorem, there exists a value p∗ ∈ (pB(k),p A(k)) at which z =0 .T o
show uniqueness, we must establish that the slope of z(p∗) is negative
when z(p∗)=0 . Using the Slutsky equations (see, for example, Varian,
Chapter 9) we can write
zp(p;r,1,k)=rh
A












where hi(.) are Hicksian demand functions, and hi
p < 0. We now show
that, evaluated at p∗, the sum of the last two terms on the right-hand
side of the above expression is negative. Note that at p∗,t y p eA ’ s
excess demand for apples is posittive, thus 1 − xA < 0.N o w , s i n c e
utility functions are assumed to be homothetic, the Marshallian deman


















This shows that the sum of the last two terms on the right-hand side
of (6) is negative. It follows that z0(p) < 0 at p∗.














where zk = rαA(p)+( 1− r)αB(p) > 0.
B .P R O O FO FP R O P O S I T I O N2
From Lemma 2, if banana endowment is small such that k<k A
then p(r;k) < 1, which implies f(r) ∈ (r, 1) whenever r ∈ (0,1),T h u s
rt increases to a limit point b r w h i c hm u s tb ee q u a lt o1. Part (ii)
is proved by a similar argument. To show part (iii), we note that
there are now three ﬁxed points, at r =0 , r =1and r = r∗(k).I t
is clear that for r ∈ (0,r∗(k)) we have f(r) >rbecause p(r;k) < 1
in this range. Likewise, for r ∈ (r∗(k),1) we have f(r) <rbecause
p(r;k) > 1 in this range. For any r0 ∈ (0,r ∗(k)), we have r1 =21
f(r0) >r 0 and since f0(r) > 0 (by Assumption A6) the sequence rt
increases monotonically to a ﬁxed point in [0,r ∗(k)] which must be
r∗(k). A similar argument shows that if r0 ∈ (r∗(k),1), the sequence
rt decreases monotonically to r∗(k).
C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Using the notation in (5), Country H’s per capita excess demand








Let m = M/N. D e n o t et h ew o r l de x c e s sd e m a n df u n c t i o nf o r
















Consider the following Lemma:
Lemma A3: Consider the country F in isolation. If δ>δ
A,t h e r e
exists π ∈ (0,1) and τ<0 such that for all p ≥ π and all rF ∈ [0,1]
we have zF(p,rF,δ,1) ≤ τ<0.
Proof of the lemma:S i n c eδ>δ
A, pA(1/δ) < 1.C h o o s e π ∈ ¡
pA(1/δ),1
¢
.G i v e n a n y p>π ,a n drF ∈ [0,1], apple lovers will be
n e ts u p p l i e r so fa p p l e s .T h es a m ei st rue for banana lovers. Hence for









Choose τ to be zF(π,rF,δ,1). The result follows.
P r o o fo ft h ep r o p o s i t i o n :From assumption A7, Z(p,rH,r F,m,N)
is downward sloping. Thus there exists a unique equilibrium world22
price pw(rH,r F,k,δ,m).S i n c ezH is increasing in rH and decreasing









Choose m∗ such that zH(pA(1/δ),1,1,k)/m∗ ≤− τ/2. This en-
sures by (7) that for all rH ∈ [0,1],a n da l lp>p A(1/δ) we have
zH(p,1,1,k)/m∗ < −τ/2 as well. Recall from Lemma A3 that (i)
pA(1/δ) < 1 and (ii) there is π ∈ (pA(1/δ),1) such that for all p ≥ π












given rH and rF ∈ [0,1] and p ≥ π. Hence the unique equilibrium
pw(rH,rF,k,δ,m) ≤ π<1. The result now follows from the fact that
as the equilibrium price is strictly less than 1, both rH
t and rF
t must
monotonically increase to 1.
APPENDIX II: PREFERENCE CYCLES
In assumption A5, we speciﬁed a replicator dynamic where the
relative price appears linearly in the denominator. It is worthwhile
t og e n e r a l i z et h i ss p e c i ﬁcation, by allowing the possibility that the
relative price appears in the denominator in a non-linear fashion.
It turns out that such generalization can generate preference cycles.
To show this, let φ(p) be a sign-preserving monotone increasing func-




rt +( 1− rt)φ(pt)
(8)
Thus, as in the special law (2), we get rt+1 = rt if and only if pt =1 .







For symmetry, it makes sense to suppose
st+1 =
st
st +( 1− st)φ(qt)




This property is satisﬁed if
φ(p)=p
λ
where λ>0. The special case λ =1would yield the rule (2). In
general, the greater is the value of λ, the higher is the relative fertility
response of apple lovers to the price of apples.
In what follows, we will assume
rt+1 =
rt
rt +( 1− rt)(pt)λ = fλ(rt) (10)
To show the possibility of preference cycles in a closed economy,







θ where θ ∈ (1/2,1)




where σ(r)=θ + r − 2θr.N o t et h a tσ(r) is decreasing in r because

















θ − k(1 − θ)
(2θ − 1)(1 + k)
This is a decreasing function of k in that interval. (Note that r∗(k) is
independent of λ>0, because p(r,k)λ =1if and only if p(r,k)=1 .)
Clearly the dynamic behavior of fλ(.) i st h es a m ea si nP r o p o s i t i o n
2i fk ≤ kA or if k ≥ kB. We now consider the case where k ∈ (kA,kB).




kp(r,k)λ [σ(r)(1 − σ(r)) − λr(1 − r)(2θ − 1)]
















> 0 for k ∈ (k
A,k
B) (12)
Note that every term on the right-hand side of equation (11) is posi-
tive, with the possible exception of the term inside the square brackets.
The sign and magnitude of this term is important in determining the
dynamics. Let us call this term g(r):
g(r)=σ(r)(1 − σ(r)) − λr(1 − r)(2θ − 1)
We note that g(0) = g(1) = θ(1 − θ) > 0,a n d
g
0(r)=( 2 r − 1)(λ − (2θ − 1))(2θ − 1)
g
00(r)=2 ( λ − (2θ − 1))(2θ − 1)
There are two cases:
Case 1: λ<2θ − 1
In this case, the function g(r) is strictly concave and reaches its
maximum at r =1 /2. Thus, for all r ∈ [0,1],g(r) ≥ g(0) > 0.I t25
follows that f0
λ(r) > 0 for all r ∈ [0,1].S i n c e r∗(k) is the only ﬁxed





Thus fλ is strictly monotone increasing and satisﬁes fλ(r) >rfor
r ∈ (0,r∗) and fλ(r) <rfor r ∈ (r∗,1). It follows that the dynamics
are very similar to Proposition 2. (The same conclusion applies if
λ =2 θ − 1.)
Case 2:λ>2θ−1. In this case, the function g(r) is strictly convex
and reaches its minimum at r =1 /2.T h u s ,f o ra l lr ∈ [0,1],
g(r) ≥ g(1/2) =









∗.Then for all r ∈ [0,1],g(r) > 0, and hence
f0
λ(r) > 0. It follows that 0 <f 0
λ(r∗) < 1 and the dynamics are very
similar to Proposition 2.
Sub-case 2b: λ>λ
∗.I n t h i s c a s e g(1/2) < 0 so fλ is no longer
strictly increasing. We shall study this case by considering the local
stability of the ﬁxed points.
The following Proposition follows from our analysis of Case 1 and
Sub-case 2a:
Proposition 4: (Case λ<λ
∗)
Suppose k ∈ (kA,k B) and r0 ∈ (0,1), and the law of motion is
rt+1 = fλ(rt).I fλ<λ
∗ then
(i) rt converges to r∗ from below, for r0 ∈ (0,r ∗)
(ii)rt converges to r∗ from above, for r0 ∈ (r∗,1).




θ(1 − θ)[kB(θ)k − 1][1 − kA(θ)k]
> 0
Proposition 5: (Case λ>λ
∗)26
Suppose k ∈ (kA,k B) and r0 ∈ (0,1), and the law of motion is
rt+1 = fλ(rt).I fλ>λ
∗ then
(i) for λ<λ
∗∗(k), r∗ is locally asymptotically stable.
(ii) for λ>λ
∗∗(k),t h eﬁxed point r∗ is not locally asymptotically
stable; there is no locally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
Remark 10: It can be shown that λ
∗∗ is strictly decreasing in
θ for θ ∈ (1/2,1).A s θ → 1, λ
∗∗ → 2.Thus, the more extreme the
preferences (values of θ close to 1), the more easy it is for instability
to arise.
We now show the possibility of cycles.i.e., that the proportions of
the two preference types can ﬂuctuate over time. To demonstrate this
in a simple manner, we ﬁxt h ev a l u eo fθ.Let θ =9 /10.(Thus kA =1 /9
and kB =9 ). In what follows, fλ(fλ(r)) is denoted as f2
λ(r).W eh a v e
Proposition 6: (two-period cycles).
Suppose θ =9 /10 and k ∈ (1/9,9). For almost all value of k in
(1/9,9), there exists a neighborhood N around r∗ such that for all
r ∈ N −{r∗},t h e r ee x i s t sλ(r) such that two-period cycles obtain, i.e.
f2
λ(r)(r)=r and r is not a ﬁxed point.
Proof: Following Devaney (1989, Theorem 12.7. page 90), we





at λ = λ





3(1 − k)(1 + k)(87k2 − 526k +8 7 )
400k2
The numerator is zero if and only if





=( 0 .17,5.88) (14)
Thus, for all k ∈ (1/9,9) except the positive roots in (14), the condi-
tion (13) holds, and the result follows.
Remark 11: The condition (13) is suﬃcient, but not necessary, for
cycles to exist. By numerical calculation, we exhibit two examples of27
cycles, where k =1(i.e., the condition (13) is not met.) In both cases,
θ is set at 9/10, and λ
∗∗ is calculted to be 2.5. With λ =2 .51 >λ
∗∗,
the proportion of apple lovers ﬂuctuates over time in a fairly narrow
band. When we pick λ =2 .55,w eo b s e r v et h a tt h ea m p l i t u d eo f
ﬂuctuations becomes quite large.
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